1/7/2024 0 Comments Krebs group ransomwhere![]() Um… do you expect to see a physical cryptocurrency wallet being raided in the YouTube video? Not only are you betting on the goodwill and reputation of anonymous criminals, but also betting on your own organization’s technical capabilities during the response. Ransomware doesn’t, and cannot, take its time for redundancy. ![]() And it’s not like restoring from encrypted backups on a RAID, where normal corruption can be fixed. Lots of things happen on a running system that can interfere and corrupt data when things are encrypting. Then there is poorly designed ransomware… which may emphasis speed of encryption over fidelity. Many companies don’t run full restoration tests during a DR exercise… so they don’t realize that it’s common for data to be corrupt just by chance. How many organizations know to create a bit for bit backup of the encrypted files AFTER infection, and BEFORE they try to restore? Once encrypted, many file backup/restore schemes don’t work the same. If someone tries to restore from backup, and starts mucking up the filesystem… then yeah, corruption will happen. Many don’t know this, but even well designed ransomware, may not decrypt with the key. So it stands to reason, that many who pay the ransom, are “reinfected” “likely by the same attacker”… because they never fully eradicated the ransomware in the first place. And those who pay the ransom, are often lacking in Disaster Recovery processes, so they feel that restoring from backups is harder/costlier than just paying up. The companies that get hit with ransomware, already have some flaws in their security posture. I would think that most of these “reinfections” are because of poor Incident Handling (Containment and Remediation). It is hard to pin down the details for this kind of thing. Here is the original study (not a syndicated article techspot > zdnet) This entry was posted on Wednesday 16th of June 2021 10:42 AM ![]() “This group is known for frequently changing malware and driving global trends in criminal malware distribution,” MITRE assessed. ![]() While CLOP as a moneymaking collective is fairly young organization, security experts say CLOP members hail from a group of Threat Actors (TA) known as “ TA505,” which MITRE‘s ATT&CK database says is a financially motivated cybercrime group that has been active since at least 2014. “The overall impact to CLOP is expected to be minor although this law enforcement attention may result in the CLOP brand getting abandoned as we’ve recently seen with other ransomware groups like DarkSide and Babuk”. “We do not believe that any core actors behind CLOP were apprehended, due to the fact that they are probably living in Russia,” Intel 471 concluded. Cybersecurity intelligence firm Intel 471 says the law enforcement raids in Ukraine were limited to the cash-out and money laundering side of CLOP’s business only. It’s not clear how much this law enforcement operation by Ukrainian authorities will affect the overall operations of the CLOP group. CLOP’s victim shaming blog on the deep web. ![]()
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